The Metaphysical Incoherence of Foreknowledge
I don't believe foreknowledge is incoherent btw kek As some of you may know, Christopher Menzel, one of the most profound and well-established Philosophers in metaphysics in the 20th Century I'm aware of, has published a paper named "Temporal Actualism and Singular Foreknowledge"" in 1991 (which you can easily find online), which attempts to show both a metaphysical and semantic problem included in our concepts of Foreknowledge as traditionally defined. In this post, I hope to simply attempt make this problem more well-known, but to be even more clear, this post is in no way some sort of dunk on Menzel's paper. My aim is to simply offer a few responses and actually just give this problem more recognition. I think Menzel is definitely right - all the solutions stipulated do invoke some heavy ontological commitments - however, I disagree with him on whether or not these views same other problems besides that. It seems like this problem ultimately makes the tr...