Kitab-Al-Tawheed

 (Note, I haven't looked that deep into this specific debate in Phil of Religion, so don't expect some god-given analysis of this topic - I'm just trying to give a basic rundown for anyone Interested) One of the most pressing objections against The "Doctrine" of Divine Timelessness is William Lane Craig's defense of the argument from Tensed Facts. The Argument goes roughly as follows: (i) For any true proposition P, God knows that proposition - and God's knowledge is meant to track the world in this context, and "see" whichever proposition comes out as true. (ii) Presentism is true. (iii) under Presentism, there are Tensed Propositions which change in truth-value. (iiii) Therefore, which true propositions there are changes. (iiiii) Therefore, God's Knowledge changes/is mutable. For a few examples of Propositions which Change in Truth-Value, does God know: "What time is it now?" "There is something (as opposed to Nothing, pre-cr...

 One criticism of the PSR which hasn't been discussed that much is the following:  Assume S5 (Which is not at all needed for the Paradox but it certainly makes our lives far easier); we can now construct Chisholm's original Adam and Noah Paradox (of Transworld Identity) - to quote Stanford since I cba: "C hisholm’s Paradox, presented in Chisholm (1967), begins innocuously enough. Suppose that individuals are identical across possible worlds such that   de re   modal claims like “Fred could have been taller” are true only in case there is some possible world where the very same individual, in this case, Fred, is taller than he is in the actual world. Now, consider that two actual individuals, Adam and Noah, could have had slightly different qualitative properties. For example, Adam, instead of dying at age 930, could have died at age 931. Similarly, Noah, instead of dying at age 950, could have died at age 949. If Adam and Noah can tolerate these incremental “changes”...

 This is from an email I sent to James T. Anderson:  This approach focuses on  Haecceities,  specifically, the Plantingian view on them. (Which he develops in his essays on Modal Metaphysics, and most popularly in The Nature of Necessity.)   There are four different motivations for this sort of view (as far as I can see), which are:  1: Haecceities are metaphysically necessary existences, meaning they satisfy the "necessity condition" of Divine Thoughts. Haecceities are intentional - insofar as they have a sort of "aboutness" to them, In other words, My haecceity seems to be "about" me - with the same reasoning apply to any other haecceity. Haecceities seem to also be primitive in nature, similar to the primitive intentionality of a Divine Mind (This might be a stretch). There's also an infinite amount of them - corresponding to each possible individual, so they fulfill the plenitude criteria as well. If we don't identify them with Divine Thoughts,...

 Necessitism is the thesis that "Necessarily, everything necessarily is something/exists." Formalized as: □∀x□∃y x=y  Essentially, for any individual or object, that object exists in every possible world, in every possible world. Or in other words, for any individual or object, if  ◇P -> □P. Intuitively, this seems insane. Clearly, I can concieve of my cat not existing, or atleast have an extremely strong intuition behind it. The most important part to this conflict between Necessitist and the Theist is how the Necessitist would respond here: Your intuition and conceivability claims are misguided, what you are actually thinking about, is that your cat could have been non-concrete , rather than not existing simpliciter. In that way, things do exist in every possible world, necessarily so, but whether or not they're concrete varies between world to world. An important bit to keep in mind, is that I - following Craig - disagree with Williamson that these objects are not...

 Recent literature on Modal approaches to God's existence have shown that there's a sort of scale on which Modal Ontological Arguments (Modal Ontological Arguments simply refer to any argument in this context which has apriori premises and uses the S5 inference from Possibly God to Necessarily God, which I'll call MOA from now on.) and Reverse MOAs (From Possibly God doesn't exist to Necessarily God doesn't exist) are placed. Multiple symmetry breakers have been presented between these arguments, with the most notable one on the atheistic side being Modal Problems of Evil. There is very few literature on this idea, yet it is brought up by Philosopher such as Brian Leftow throuhgout their work. In this blogpost, I hope to show that Modal Problems of Evil are far more superior to Theistic Modal Arguments to God in regards to The Possibility Premise and the Inferences being made, and that the Theist should not attempt to engage with the Possibility Premise at all, as t...